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Abstract
In models of redistribution, dierences in human capital are often the relevant source of hetero-
geneity amongst individuals. Presumably, the distribution of human capital can be manipulated
through education spending. This paper examines the use of education as a redistributive tool
when there is a nonlinear tax system in place. The results show that taxation, whether under full
or asymmetric information, substantially reduces the redistributive role of education spending in
maximizing social welfare. This points to a con
ict between the equalization of utility and human
capital outcomes.
Keywords: Optimal nonlinear taxation, redistribution, education
JEL Classication Numbers: D63, H21
I am grateful to Robin Boadway, Charles Beach, David Byrne, Mike Hoy, Marcelin Joanis, Adnan Khan, Pierre
Pestieau, Sumon Majumdar, Afrasiab Mirza and James Thompson for helpful comments and discussions as well as
and seminar participants at Queen's University, the University of Alberta, Australian National University, Singapore
Management University, Wilfrid Laurier University, Les Journ ees Louis-Andr e G erard-Varet (2010) and the Canadian
Public Economics Group meetings (2010). I am especially indebted to the referees who provided excellent feedback
and helped to substantially improve the paper.
yAddress: Department of Economics, University of Alberta, Edmonton AB, Canada.T6G 2H4. Telephone: 1-780-
492-4405, E-mail: eric.stephens@ualberta.ca.\Men are not born equal, they are not born free; they are born a most various multitude
enmeshed in an ancient and complex social net." [H.G Wells, Outline of History]
1 Introduction
Education has long been seen as integral to the health of a society. Schooling increases produc-
tivity and can also facilitate social mobility. In this way it seems a natural tool for redistribution
as it directly impacts the distribution of skills. Indeed, in most societies it is uncontroversial for
the state to play an important role in the provision of education. The reasons for and the impli-
cations of this however, are far from obvious. In particular, the distinction between economic and
philosophical/ethical arguments is often unclear.
Following Arrow (1971), denote policies which spend more (less) resources on those with lower
individual endowments as progressive (regressive). A more progressive education policy generally
represents an attempt to create more equality in individual productivity. There are numerous rea-
sonable justications for such policies, however these tend to extend beyond conventional models
of redistribution. This paper is an attempt to characterize the role of education spending in a stan-
dard (welfarist) redistribution problem. To do this we analyze education spending decisions when
individuals receive subsequent transfers through the tax system. In an initial period human capital
is determined by a technology which maps individual characteristics and public spending on educa-
tion into productivity. Thus, the distribution of skills is in
uenced by the policy maker through the
education spending decision. Once the education spending choice is made the government employs
cash transfers through the tax system.
If there were only an education spending choice and no subsequent transfers, all redistribution
would come through education. In this case a progressive policy will be optimal for a planner with a
sucient aversion to inequality.1 When individuals are subject to a redistributive tax system once
educated, as they generally are, the analysis becomes more complicated. If welfare is ultimately
determined by outcomes under the tax system, then we must characterize the impacts of changes
to the distribution of skills in the tax problem. Generally considered exogenous, the distribution
of skills clearly plays an important role in the optimal income tax problem. In his seminal paper,
Mirrlees (1971) conjectures:
\The results seem to say that, in an economy where there is more intrinsic inequality
in economic skill, the income tax is a more important weapon of public control than it
is in an economy where the dispersion of innate skills is less. The reason is, presum-
ably, that the labour-discouraging eects of the tax are more important, relative to the
redistributive benets, in the latter case."
It is plausible that greater equality in productivity, which implies less redistribution through
taxation, could mean less distortion to labour markets and an increase in social welfare. This
1For a general discussion of the case with a utilitarian social objective see Arrow (1971).
1suggests that an education policy which results in a more equal distribution of human capital may
be optimal. The analysis presented below suggests the contrary in that optimal education policy,
which may be progressive in the absence of cash transfers, is regressive due to taxation. In other
words, transfers through the tax system imply a reduced role for education in equalizing utility.
This is true whether taxation is distortionary or not.
The intuition for this result is fairly straightforward when cash transfers are made under full
information. In this case the role of education in equalizing utility is reduced because taxation is
not distortionary and high levels of education spending on those with low endowments is costly
and unnecessary. When cash transfers are made under asymmetric information (so that taxation
is distortionary) the role of education spending is less clear. Contrary to the above conjecture,
increasing the relative productivity of low types can actually increase the distortion caused by
taxation. With only two types of individuals this is unambiguous and is explained by the rising
cost of incentive compatibility in the tax problem between increasingly homogeneous individuals.
In a richer framework with many types and multiple sources of individual heterogeneity this may
not be the case. For example when tax treatment can be conditioned on education spending, as in
the literature on tagging, the eect of asymmetric information is ambiguous so that distortionary
taxation can imply a more progressive education policy than the full information case. Even so,
optimal funding is still regressive under both informational assumptions.
The results described above suggest that more progressive education policies are not optimal
because they reduce inequality in human capital outcomes which hinders the redistribution of
cash. Given this, we also perform a related comparative statics exercise which directly considers
the welfare eect of a mean-preserving reduction in the dispersion of the wage distribution. In
accordance with the previous analysis we see that a reduction in wage inequality (which can be
interpreted as resulting from a progressive education policy) is indeed welfare reducing in the
presence of cash transfers under both full and asymmetric information.
It is important to stress that there are many reasonable arguments to support progressive ed-
ucation policies that go beyond the framework that is employed in this paper. For example, we
may view human capital as intrinsically valuable for a variety of reasons such as self-esteem or
health outcomes, or consider the impacts of the distribution of human capital on externalities such
as voter savvy or crime.2 Furthermore, progressive policy prescriptions may result from political
considerations or from the use of dierent normative criteria as in the so-called \equal opportu-
nity" literature.3 Since we purposely abstract from these and other important issues to gain clear
results we must be careful not to interpret the conclusions too literally. That said, consumption
and leisure outcomes are presumably important to any social objective and the analysis points to a
con
ict between the equalization of educational attainments and the maximization of social welfare.
2For example see Usher (1997).
3For an introduction to many of the relevant issues see Roemer (1998) or Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005).
2Review of the literature
In the analysis of non-linear taxation pioneered by Mirrlees (1971) the relevant heterogeneity
in the population is over individual productivity or skills. In the literature the distribution of skills
is generally considered xed, which is relaxed in this paper. In particular, the model is used to
analyze redistributions through individual skills or wages as well as taxes. This has implications
for the literature on optimal taxation but can also be viewed as a contribution to the discussion on
education policy.
The distribution of skills has important implications for the optimal tax problem.4 Using
a simulation approach, Kanbur and Tuomala (1994) analyze the eect of inequality in skills on
the shape of the optimal tax scheme. More recent theoretical contributions include Brett and
Weymark (2008) and Simula (2010), who consider the impact of changes in productivities to the
optimal tax scheme in a model with quasi-linear preferences (the former linear in leisure, the latter
in consumption) and a weighted utilitarian objective function. In contrast, the focus of this paper
is in characterizing the eects of changes to the distribution of skills on social welfare rather than
the shape of the optimal tax scheme per se.
There is a large literature on education and redistribution that is relevant to the analysis
presented here. In a seminal paper, Arrow (1971) analyzes the division of program spending when
there is no further redistribution and describes the progressivity/regressivity of optimal policy
(although his analysis is not specic to education). Bruno (1976), Ulph (1977) and Hare and Ulph
(1979) extend this to focus on education and assume that schooling takes place in an initial period
and taxation/redistribution in a second stage, which is assumed here as well. This framework
generally implies that the optimal policy is that which maximizes the size of the output which
is then redistributed through the tax system. As increasing total output often means spending
on those with better endowments these models imply more regressive education spending. In
deriving their results, the authors make strong informational assumptions and/or assume a xed
labour supply. These conclusions are similar in spirit to those presented in this paper, particularly
the case where tax redistributions take place under perfect information and lump-sum taxes are
employed. This paper extends their conclusions to the more standard income taxation setting in
which individuals make labour supply decisions along an intensive margin and the tax scheme must
be incentive compatible.
In a more recent paper, Krause (2006) shows that subsidies for \white collar" education, which
can be viewed as a regressive education policy, may be consistent with an optimal redistributive
program. He argues that subsidies may be optimal as they facilitate incentive compatibility in
labour supply decisions (i.e. they increase dierences in skills which in turn reduces the desire of
high types to mimic low types in the income tax problem). Cremer et al. (2011) also consider a
redistribution problem with endogenous productivity which is closely related to this paper. They
4A good illustration of this is found in Boadway et al. (2000), who derive qualitative properties of the tax function
for various skill distributions.
3show that with two identical individuals whose wages are endogenous, an equal wage policy will be
inferior to one with extreme inequality in which all resources are spent on only one individual. The
authors use this example to argue that inequality in productivities can be welfare improving due to
non-convexities in the optimal tax problem. This is the force behind the results presented in this
paper, as well as Krause (2006) and is generalized here in a variety of important ways. Relative
to Cremer et al. (2011), we characterize education policy more generally rather than focusing on
corner solutions. Furthermore, we allow for diminishing returns to education spending which can
have non-trivial implications in the two-type case. More importantly the model incorporates many
individual types (although the two-type case is discussed in-depth), which is interesting for a few
reasons. With only two types, as in both Krause (2006) and Cremer et al. (2011), the optimal
marginal income tax is regressive. The low-productivity type faces a positive marginal income
tax and the high-productivity type does not, which is the standard \no distortion at the top"
result. With many types this is not the case and we may have a progressive marginal income tax
scheme (at least over some range of types), which is what we observe in all developed countries.
With progressive marginal income taxation the labour supply of more productive types is more
distorted, which is presumably when increasing the relative productivity of lower types will be
most benecial. Along with many types, more than one type of individual heterogeneity in the
ability to benet from education is also incorporated in the model. This allows for a more interesting
set of informational assumptions; in particular we can allow the policy maker to condition taxes on
educational policy as in the literature on tagging.
Finally, Fleurbaey et al. (2002) consider a model with educational investments that is also rele-
vant here. The authors use a mechanism-design approach to consider the progressivity/regressivity
of schooling expenditures where ability is private information and agents have dierent talents. The
planner is endowed with a xed sum of money that is distributed either in cash or in kind (through
educational \help" which reduces the cost of acquiring education). They show that when eort
and help are substitutes the second-best optimum involves more education spending on low-types
(at the expense of less eort from these types), along with money transfers to reduce consumption
inequality. If eort and help are complementary, then the high-types receive more education help.
Thus the regressivity/progressivity of education spending depends on the particular specication.
In either case, however, education levels and individual eorts increase with talent, so that policy is
always output regressive as dened by Arrow (1971). Interestingly, they nd that the more averse
to inequality is the planner the more inequality we see in educational attainment. So in this case
as well equalization of individual educational attainments may con
ict with that of utility levels,
albeit for somewhat dierent reasons.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the general environment. Section 3 considers
a simplied model that portrays the intuition and motivation for sections 4 and 5, where a more
general approach is discussed. Section 6 concludes.
42 Environment
Social preferences aggregate individual utility through a standard concave social welfare function
denoted 	(). Individual utility is dened by the concave function u(c;l), where the bundle (c;l) 2
R+R+ denotes units of consumption and labour supplied. Consumption consists solely of a single
good whose price is normalized to one. It is assumed that the labour market is competitive and
individuals are paid a wage w. At a given wage each individual optimizes utility and supplies l(w)
units of labour, which implies a pre-tax income of y(w) = wl(w). Pre-tax income could also be
considered one's labour supply in eciency units. As is common in the optimal tax literature we
rewrite utility in terms of consumption and pre-tax income u(c;l) = u(c;y=w).
Education spending is targeted to specic locations and takes place in an initial time period,
after which students enter the working world where they pay taxes and receive transfers. Our
focus is on the allocation of a xed education budget across two districts, where ej is dened as
the amount of educational spending in district j 2 fp;rg. The subscripts fp;rg represent low-
productivity \poor" and high-productivity \rich" respectively. The budget is normalized to one
and the fraction of education funds spent in the low-productivity district is denoted , so that
ep =  and er = 1   .5
Wages, denoted wj(i;ej), are increasing and concave in government education spending ej
and individual characteristics i, where i = 1;:::; n
2 and 1 < ::: <  n
2.6 Let individuals from the
rich location have a higher earning capacity, so that wr(;e) > wp(;e) for any (;e) pair. This
notation is chosen to capture the positive empirical relationship between parent's socioeconomic
status and their children's outcomes.7 It is assumed that location is observable at the time of
education spending. Individual characteristics i are never known to the policy maker, either at
the time of education or during working life in which redistributions can be made through the tax
system.
5Allowing for an endogenous level of spending is relatively straightforward but yields little in the existing frame-
work. Note also that education funds in the model are distributed by a central authority which is not the case in
practice (at least not everywhere and not totally). A political model of local education funding is beyond the scope
of this paper, so we simply note that spending can be interpreted as a set of transfers across districts imposed by a
central government. Such transfers have been the source of heated debate in recent years since budgets are generally
funded largely by the local tax base which can lead to sizable heterogeneity in resources across communities. For a
discussion of these and related issues, see Berne (1988) or Fernandez and Rogerson (1996).
6It is assumed that wages are exogenous from the individual's perspective. This approach is in line with Roemer
(1998) and is consistent with primary/secondary education if we take the view that children's aversion to schoolwork
is irrelevant and may be more restrictive when considering higher education. Relevant papers analyzing the impact
of taxation on educational investments include Maldonado (2008), Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), Fleurbaey et. al
(2002), Boadway et. al (1996).
7There is a vast empirical literature on the impact of \local eects" on children's academic outcomes (examples
include Goux and Maurin (2007), Ding and Lehrer (2007) or Hoxby (2000)) as well as the impact on entrepreneurial
success (see Gomez and Santor (2001)). Related theoretical contributions include C. de Bartolome (1990) and
Benabou (1996a,b).
53 Two types
If there is no individual heterogeneity within each district, then wages are a function solely of
the location in which one is educated. Thus, there are two types as there are two districts. Once
working, students educated in the high-productivity district receive wage wr(1 ) while those from
the low-productivity district receive wp(). Further, dene the elasticity of wages with respect to
education funding as 
j
w = ej=wj(ej)  dwj(ej)=dej. Throughout the analysis it is assumed that

j
w = w is constant and equal for both types, the implications of this are discussed below.
Along with the optimal education policy we are also interested in two other policies (which may
or may not be optimal). The equal funding policy  = 1=2 and what we refer to as the egalitarian
policy E. When  is greater (less) than 1=2 education spending is progressive (regressive). The
egalitarian education policy is dened as that which generates the most equal distribution of wages
possible across the two districts. When there are only two types this is simply the policy which
equalizes wages across the two locations, so that wr(1   E) = wp(E). Throughout, we restrict
attention to  2 [0;E] for obvious reasons. Note that wr(x) > wp(x) 8x ) E > 1=2.
In the optimal tax literature it is standard to assume there is asymmetric information. In
particular, that the government can observe income but not the wage rate or labour supply of
individuals. Indeed, tax schemes are generally a function of one's reported income and not earning
capacity. Given this, it is instructive to study optimal education spending both when cash transfers
are made under full and asymmetric information. We refer to the former as the rst-best and the
latter as second-best. Regardless of the informational assumptions in the tax problem it is assumed
that the policy maker can observe location when undertaking education spending. This implies that
educational transfers can always be made directly, unlike cash transfers which must be incentive
compatible under asymmetric information.
3.1 No asymmetric information: rst-best
Consider the problem recursively and note that the initial education choice impacts welfare
which is dened as the solution to the optimal tax problem. Under perfect information this is
characterized by
Wfb = max
cp;cr;yp;yr 	(vp) + 	(vr) s.t yp + yr  cp + cr; (1)
in which we denote individual utility vj = u(cj;yj=wj). Using subscripts to denote partial deriva-














wj = 0 for j = p;r (2)
This problem is analogous to that where the government uses lump-sum transfers to maximize
welfare, as can be seen in expression (2) which is equivalent to individual utility maximization in
6the absence of distortionary taxes.8 To analyze the education spending problem we characterize the
eect of changes in  on welfare, as dened by the solution to (1). The following lemma describes
the optimal fraction of educational resources spent on each location when the policy-maker has full
information.
Lemma 1 The rst-best education policy, denoted fb, is regressive. Specically, fb < 1
2.
Proof. See Appendix.
The optimal policy will depend on the social objective, the assumptions about the wage tech-
nology and the form of utility. Regardless of the specics it will never be optimal to spend a larger
fraction of educational resources on the low-productivity type.9 This is ensured by the constant
elasticity assumption made earlier and a less restrictive sucient condition is described in the proof
of Lemma 1. It is important to recall at this point that without cash transfers there is always a case
for progressive spending anywhere up to E (which would be optimal with a sucient aversion to
inequality). When cash transfers can be made under full information, optimal education spending
is that which maximizes the size of the pie and consequently spends less on those who are less
productive. In other words, progressive education spending is costly and unnecessary when cash
transfers are not distortionary. With asymmetric information in the tax stage it is not clear that
this will be the case as taxation is distortionary and it is plausible that there is a greater role for
education in equalizing utility.
3.2 Asymmetric information: second-best
The optimal taxation literature generally assumes that policy makers do not have information
regarding individual wages. When this is the case the cash redistribution scheme must be incentive
compatible, which results in the use of distortionary taxation. In the context of the model this
implies that the government can spend on education knowing which is the high and low type
(presumably this takes place in an earlier period), but once they enter the workforce they can not
(or will not) dierentiate between the two.
The limited record-keeping assumption is reasonable because tracking educational expenditures
requires a very strong degree of coordination between various levels of government over a large
period of time. Furthermore, conditioning taxation on childhood location in a more realistic model
may violate the principle of horizontal equity. For example, imagine a situation with two individuals
whose wages are a function of education obtained early in life and unobservable random \luck" later
in life. Suppose the individual from the poor location was \lucky" and the individual from the rich
location was \unlucky", so that both end up with equal earning capacity. It is not clear that the
individual who attended school in the poor district deserves preferential tax treatment if good luck
8Lump-sum transfers will generally in
uence the supply of labour through income eects. Here we are referring
to the distortions caused by positive marginal tax rates.
9Note that we cannot rule out corner solutions, and in fact for a large class of utility and human capital functions

fb = 0.
7is as arbitrary as place of birth. However, it is important to note that educational transfers may
still be justied at the time of schooling if the poor individual is worse o ex-ante. In short, it is
very dicult to implement or justify tax policy that is based on anything but current information.
This is presumably why income tax systems are designed this way and limited record-keeping is
commonly assumed in the literature. In the model presented here; if the planner were able to keep
track of spending in the initial stages then with two types we are simply back to the rst-best
problem where lump-sum transfers are employed. For the more general case in section 4 where
there is unobserved individual heterogeneity the results of relaxing this are less obvious and are
modeled below.
As described in Lemma 1, education spending is regressive because spending on low types is
inecient and cash transfers are not. Is there is a greater redistributive role for educational transfers
when cash transfers are distortionary? To analyze the impacts of education in the second-best we
rst dene Wsb to be the solution to the optimal tax problem in the second stage. This is the same














The incentive constraint requires that the optimal allocation for a high type provide at least as
much utility as is attained by the high type mimicking the low.10 Denoting the Lagrange multipliers
for the budget and incentive constraints  and 















































These expressions are the analogue to (2) in the rst-best. With asymmetric information the left
side of each expression is no longer set equal to zero for both individuals. The term on the right
hand side of equation (4) is strictly positive for the low type whenever the incentive constraint binds
(
 > 0), which implies a positive marginal tax rate. On the other hand, the expression for the high
type is that found in the rst-best, which is the familiar \no distortion at the top" condition.
Solving directly for the optimal second-best education policy, which we denote sb, is not feasible
without restrictive assumptions. However, we can characterize the salient features of the optimum
in the following proposition. The proof requires some restrictions on the individual utility function
which are not required for the other results in the paper and are discussed in the appendix. The
diculty arises because the eects on individual utility resulting from a change in  depend on the
10We ignore the incentive constraint that ensures low types do not wish to mimic high types. It is straight-forward
to show that this is redundant.
8consumption/income bundle they receive under the optimal tax. These bundles can be characterized
but not derived explicitly at this level of generality. A sucient, but not necessary condition for
the proposition to hold is u12  0. This captures a large class of functions commonly used in the
tax literature, such as Cobb Douglas or additive separable utility.
Proposition 1 When the rst-best is not implementable, so that the incentive constraint in the
tax problem is binding, sb < fb < 1
2. Asymmetric information in the tax problem leads to a more
regressive education policy.
Proof. See Appendix.
In deriving this result, we decompose the eects of a change in  into \direct" and \indirect"
eects. The former being the eect from a change in wage on each individual utility directly. The
latter representing the eect on the incentive constraint from the tax problem (see the proof of
Proposition 1 for details). The direct eect is positive when the aversion to inequality is large
enough but the eect on incentives is always negative. This can be explained by considering the
solution to the optimal tax problem which implies a positive marginal tax on the low type (which
discourages working) to maintain incentive compatibility. Thus, the value in increasing the relative
wage of the low type cannot be fully realized in the second-best because of the downward distortion
caused by the tax. In fact, increases in  will tighten the incentive constraint in the tax problem
as mimicking will be more attractive. Since more equal wages increase the deadweight cost of
taxation, cash is even more attractive relative to education for redistribution in the second-best.11
The proposition holds when the rst-best is not implementable and thus an important exception
and a case where progressive funding can be optimal is at the corner E. The egalitarian policy
is a local optimum because there is no need for redistribution once productivities are completely
equalized. Cremer et al. (2011) contrast the two extreme policies (corner solutions) that roughly
correspond to  = 0 and  = E in the model presented here. The authors argue that wage
dierentiation ( = 0) is preferred to the equal wage solution ( = E). This result follows from
restrictions on the wage technology, without which we cannot rule out E as an optimum.12 At rst
glance this seems to provide some support for an egalitarian policy. However, this arises because
there are only two types in the model and the planner can completely eliminate tax transfers.
Section 4 considers a more realistic environment where there is unobservable heterogeneity across
types so that there are always ex-post dierences amongst individuals. When this is the case the
policy maker can never completely eliminate cash redistributions, implying that the egalitarian
policy is no longer a local optimum.
11Maldonado (2008) considers an environment similar to that outlined in Section 3 in which the elasticity of
wages with respect to education is not xed, but the result of individual choice. This elasticity is shown to have
implications for both income taxes and education subsidies. Fixed elasticity is not vital to Proposition 1 because of
the limited record keeping assumption. The analysis in Maldonado (2008) assumes that taxation decisions are made
with knowledge of education choices in the rst stage, which is not the case here. Furthermore, unlike Maldonado
(2008), education of high types may be over-provided at the optimum.
12E can be ruled out as an optimum when diminishing returns in the wage technology and the disutility of labour
are not too large.
94 Individual heterogeneity
With two types the optimal marginal income tax is regressive. Specically, we see a positive
marginal tax on the low type and a zero marginal tax on the high type. This was shown to result
in a more regressive education policy. Does this extend to the case with many types in which the
optimal marginal tax schedule can take a variety of forms? In particular, the optimal marginal tax
schedule may be increasing at high levels of income, see for example Diamond (1998) or Boadway
et. al. (2000). It seems reasonable that the return to raising the relative wages of those with lower
productivity is higher if they are less distorted by the tax system. When there are many types,
progressive marginal income taxes may be optimal (at least over some range) and it is not clear
that the conclusions drawn in Section 3 will remain valid.
This section introduces a second source of heterogeneity by means of the individual-specic
endowment i, where i = 1;:::; n
2 and 1 < ::: <  n
2. This could represent innate talents, good
family environment, charisma, or any such combination of the like. It is assumed for simplicity that
the distribution of  is the same in each district. The exact interpretation of  is immaterial, what
is important is that wages dier across individuals for reasons that are not observable. Individuals
continue to dier with respect to location as described in section 3, which is observable to the
policy maker when undertaking education spending. Wages will now depend on both individual
endowments and location and are dened by
wij = iwj(ej); (6)
where the function wj(ej) is unchanged from section 3.13 We continue to assume there are two
locations so there are a total of n individual types. The egalitarian policy E again represents the
upper bound on education spending and is dened as in section 3 by wp(E) = wr(1 E). Thus, E
completely equalizes the local component of wages so that the distribution is equal across districts
(those with the same value of  receive the same wage).
4.1 No asymmetric information: rst-best


















13The multiplicative form implies that  and educational spending are complementary inputs to individual wages.
Hence, within each location higher  students will have a higher marginal return to educational expenditures. There
has been some empirical analysis regarding this issue but little in the way of conclusive results. References include
Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998), Arias, Hallock, and Sosa (1999), Tobias (2003) and Martins and Pereira (2004). A
similar assumption has been made in a number of previous relevant theoretical contributions, such as Hare and Ulph
(1979) and Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005).














wij = 0 for 8i;j; (8)
which is akin to the simpler model in that expression (8) characterizes individual utility maximiza-
tion in the absence of marginal income taxes. Given this we obtain the analogue of Lemma 1 which
characterizes the optimal education policy in the rst-best with many types and two sources of
heterogeneity.
Lemma 2 The rst-best education policy, denoted fb, is regressive. Specically, fb < 1
2.
Proof. See Appendix.
As with the simpler model the optimal policy will depend on the social objective, the assump-
tions about the wage technology and the form of utility. Similarly, it is never optimal to spend
a larger fraction of educational resources on the low-productivity type when the planner has full
information.
4.2 Asymmetric information: second-best
The introduction of asymmetric information in the simpler model led to an even more regressive
education policy. With many types, the marginal tax schedule may take a variety of shapes and the
eects of education spending on incentives is much less obvious. Denote welfare in the second-best
by Wsb, which is characterized by (7) with the following additional set of incentive constraints that














8h;k 6= i;j: (9)
In the absence of unobservable individual heterogeneity, knowledge of previous education policy
provides a tax-setter with perfect information. Thus, in the model with two types the second-
best problem is equivalent to the rst-best. With unobservable dierences amongst individuals
there is still asymmetric information in the second stage even when tax authorities can track
educational expenditures. Below, we consider the optimal education policy when income taxes can
be conditioned on location and when they can not.
Let us rst consider the case for which the policy maker cannot condition the tax scheme on
education history. As there is no way to determine the ordering of the wage distribution we simply
denote each of the n individuals by s. Let 
s be the multiplier on the incentive constraint that
restricts individual s from mimicking individual s   1. Focusing only the downward incentive












































The sign of each term depends entirely on dws=d, as gross income y(w) is non-decreasing in the
wage. For any individual s in the low-productivity (high-productivity) district, this will be positive
(negative). As with the simpler case, we can decompose the impact of a change in  into \direct"
and \incentive eects" (see the proof of Proposition 1 for details). The magnitude of these eects
depends on the various functional forms for utility, the wage technology and the social welfare
objective. Note that the direct eects are always positive with a high social aversion to inequality,
which is obvious when 	() is maximin. Importantly, the incentive impacts which are strictly
negative when n = 2 are of ambiguous sign and we do not have an analogue to Proposition 1.15
The ambiguous impact of spending on incentives makes it more dicult to characterize sb under
these informational assumptions (Section 5 employs a reduced-form model to capture the impact
of a more equal distribution of skills in a similar problem). We can however, derive the following
result regarding the egalitarian policy.
Proposition 2 With many types and unobservable heterogeneity, the egalitarian policy is too pro-
gressive.
Proof. See Appendix.
To interpret this result, rst consider the situation in which there is no redistribution through
the tax system. In this case any equalization by the planner must be done through education
spending. With only the one instrument progressive policies up to and including E are optimal
under a social welfare objective with sucient aversion to inequality. Proposition 2 states that in
the more general case, the introduction of cash transfers implies that E is never optimal regardless
of social preferences (recall from the discussion following Proposition 1 that the corner solution E
can not be ruled out as the optimum in the two type case). In this sense the redistributive role for
education is reduced when individuals are subject to a redistributive tax scheme, even when cash
transfers are distortionary.
Proposition 2 states that with taxation a complete equalization across districts must be justied
by considerations that go beyond the framework considered here. As mentioned earlier, there is a
14This is the \normal" case considered in the literature, in which redistributions go from the rich to the poor.
15The sign of dws=d completely determines the sign of the incentive eect only when the restrictions on utility
discussed in Proposition 1 are met. Regardless, the eects on incentives from a change in  are ambiguous here.
12variety of perfectly reasonable justications for E (or progressive policy more generally) that come
from outside the model even when cash transfers are available. For example, if we view individual
utility as being derived directly from human capital and not from the income it is presumed to
generate then E could again be optimal. Alternatively, E can be also be justied through the use
of a dierent normative criterion as in the literature on \equal opportunity".16 If these types of
arguments are taken seriously (and there is no reason they should not be), then the results imply
a trade-o between various objectives.
The preceding result assumes that taxes cannot be conditioned on individual location. The
following proposition considers the case where the tax-setter can observe the location in which one
was schooled, as in the literature on tagging.17
Proposition 3 When individuals in each observable group receive separate tax treatment (tagging
by location), the optimal second-best education policy is regressive, so that sb < 1
2. However, unlike
the two-type case, optimal policy may be more or less regressive than the rst-best.
Proof. See Appendix.
The results imply regressive education funding as in the simpler two-type model while capturing
the intuition behind progressive arguments in a more interesting way. Specically, we see it is indeed
possible for education spending to be more progressive in the second-best. This is true when the
relative output from the poor district is higher with income taxation, which is possible if marginal
taxes are progressive enough (details in the proof of Proposition 3). However, even if this is the
case the optimal policy will still be regressive in that less educational resources are always spent
on the poor location. Furthermore, we see that regardless of whether or not taxes are conditioned
on location the egalitarian policy is never optimal when there is income taxation.
5 Continuum of types
In the framework presented above, more progressive education policies represent an attempt
to generate a more equal distribution of wages. In this sense we can interpret a higher  (a more
progressive policy) as one which results in a reduction in the dispersion of the wage distribution
and possibly the mean depending on the assumptions regarding the wage functions.18 When there
16Following Roemer (1998), it is relatively straightforward to characterize the equal opportunity policy here. Be-
cause we have assumed individuals have homogeneous preferences, the equal opportunity policy is simply that which
equalizes wages. With two types this is the egalitarian policy E. The introduction of a second source of heterogene-
ity complicates the issue and the link is more tenuous. Hypothetically, the equal opportunity policy should equalize
wages across both dimensions of heterogeneity as these are beyond the individual's control. We have assumed that
dierences in  simply cannot be observed at the time of education and can interpret E as an equal opportunity
policy in the sense that it produces the most equal distribution possible.
17The seminal contribution is Akerlof (1978).
18With respect to the framework presented above, if we have a continuum of both rich and poor individuals the
overall distribution is simply the convolution of the two. In the spirit of the previous discussion an increase in
 represented a transfer of educational resources from the higher productivity to the lower productivity district.
Appropriate restrictions on the human capital technology will ensure that such a transfer will indeed reduce the
dispersion of the overall wage distribution.
13are two types this is straightforward and involves a transfer of educational resources from those
with relatively high to low wages. For example, the egalitarian policy E represents the extreme
case in which there is no dispersion in the resulting wage distribution. The results thus far suggest
that while such policies may be optimal in the absence of income taxation, they are not generally
optimal when cash transfers are available. This section extends the analysis to a continuum of
types and considers the impact of a reduction in the dispersion of the wage distribution, which is
presumed to result from a more progressive education policy.
Let there now be a continuum of individuals who dier in their wages. Characterize the dis-
tribution of wages using the distribution function F(w), for w 2 [w;w]. Consider a subset of
individuals S = [ws;ws], where w < ws < ws < w. Let the elements of S be centered around the




ws wdF(w). Normalize the mass of types belonging to
the set S to one, so that
R ws
ws f(w)dw = 1. To capture changes in the distribution, dene the wage
for individual s 2 S as
ws = (1   )w + wm: (12)
Thus,  = 0 recovers the initial distribution of wages. For some  > 0, we will see a reduction in
the dispersion of wages. The change is such that the average wage will remain constant, which can
be interpreted as a costless redistribution of productivity from high to low types.19 As with our
earlier analysis we consider changes to the wage distribution when there are subsequent transfers
through the tax system. However, this is considered directly rather than characterized through the
rst and second-best education policy. Specically, we show that a mean-preserving reduction in
the variance of wages reduces welfare whether taxation is distortionary or not. This is a valuable
exercise because it allows us to capture the phenomena described in the previous two sections in a
way that more closely relates to the large body of literature on taxation and the income distribution.
5.1 No asymmetric information: rst-best
If individual type is known to the policy-maker in the tax stage then lump-sum transfers can be
employed to achieve redistributive goals. Denote the lump-sum tax for type w (possibly negative)
as Tw. Given Tw, individuals solve
max
l
u(wl   Tw;l); (13)
which yields labour supply l(w) and indirect utility V (w;Tw). For simplicity, we assume throughout





V (w;Tw)f(w)dw subject to
Z w
w
Twf(w)dw  0: (14)
19We ignore the eciency loss that will likely arise when transferring educational resources amongst locations.
Allowing for costly redistribution complicates the issue and would only serve to strengthen the results.
14The following lemma considers the impact on welfare, described by the solution to (14), of a
reduction in the variance of the wage distribution.
Lemma 3 In the rst-best, when individual wages are observable to the tax authority; an increase
in , which results in a costless reduction in the variance of the wage distribution, is welfare-reducing.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for Lemma 3 is straightforward. An increase in  results in a reduction in the
wages of higher types while increasing that of lower types. Since higher types are producing more
(with more labour supplied), this will reduce the size of aggregate output that can be redistributed,
and have a negative impact on welfare.
5.2 Asymmetric information: second-best
That an increase in  is welfare-reducing depends importantly on the rst-best environment.
In particular, redistribution takes place only over consumption outcomes and high wage types
are providing relatively cheap labour to subsidize the consumption of lower types. As types are
observable transfers ensure all individuals have the same marginal utility of consumption, but high
types work more and thus have lower utility (see the proof of Lemma 3 for details). When the
informational environment is changed so that individual type is unobservable to the tax-setter, this
will not be the case. In particular, the incentive constraints ensure that higher types will be better
o, and the implications of a lower variance on welfare are much less obvious.
The introduction of informational asymmetry in the continuous type case increases the complex-
ity of the problem substantially. To simplify, in this sub-section we let utility be characterized by
the quasi-linear in leisure function u(c) l, where c is consumption, l is labour, and u() is increas-
ing and concave. In solving the optimal tax problem the government chooses consumption-income
bundles subject to the budget and incentive constraints. The budget constraint is represented by
Z w
w
[y(w)   c(w)]dF(w)  0: (15)
Before characterizing the incentive constraints we transform utility so that we can substitute y(w)
out of the problem. Dene V (w) as
V (w) = wu(c(w))   y(w): (16)
Using this transformation, write the incentive constraint for individual of wage type w
V (w)  V (w0) + (w   w0)u(c(w0)) 8w0: (17)
Incentive compatibility requires V (w0)+(w  w0)u(c(w0)) attain a maximum with respect to w0 at
w0 = w. This yields the rst-order incentive compatibility condition
dV (w)
dw = u(c(w)). The second-
15order incentive compatibility condition requires that c be non-decreasing in w, or
dc(w)
dw  0.20 The



















dw and rewrite the second-order incentive compatibility constraint as z(w)  0.
In the control problem described in (18)-(21) we treat z(w) as a control and V (w) and c(w) as




f(w) + [wu(c(w))   V (w)   c(w)]f(w) + (w)u(c(w)) + (w)z(w) + (w)z(w);
where  is interpreted as the shadow price of government funds (which is independent of w), (w) is
the co-state variable associated with the equation of motion for V (w), (w) is the co-state variable
associated with dc(w)=dw = z(w) and nally (w) is the shadow value of the non-negativity
constraint on z(w). The following proposition considers the impact on welfare, described by the
solution to the optimal tax problem outlined in (18)-(21), of a reduction in the variance of the wage
distribution.
Proposition 4 In the second-best, when individual wages are not observable to the tax authority;
an increase in , which amounts to a costless reduction in the variance of the wage distribution, is
welfare-reducing when individual utility is quasi-linear in leisure and social preferences are utilitar-
ian.
Proof. See Appendix.
In support of the previous results, we see that the direct increase in utility to lower types that
arises from a transfer of productivity is more than oset by the loss in transfers through taxation.
It is important to note that the result does not depend on the specic structure of the tax system.
20For an in-depth discussion of the optimal income tax problem with quasi-linear in leisure preferences, see Ebert
(1992) or Boadway et al. (2000).
16At this level of generality the marginal tax schedule can take any number of forms and in particular
can be increasing at high levels of income.21
6 Conclusions
In the absence of transfers through the tax system there is always a case for a more equal
distribution of productivity. When cash transfers are introduced the role for education spending
in equalizing utility is diminished. This is most straight-forward when taxation takes place under
full information. In this situation educational transfers to low types are costly and unnecessary
as cash transfers are not distortionary. This leads to an optimal education spending policy that
maximizes the size of the \pie" to be redistributed and consequently spends less on those with
lower initial endowments (resulting in less equality in wages). In the more realistic case where cash
transfers are made under asymmetric information the story is less clear. Intuition might suggest
that greater equality in wages, which implies less redistribution through taxation, could mean less
distortion to labour markets and result in an increase in social welfare. Contrary to this the results
indicate that asymmetric information can lead to an even more regressive education policy. Even
when asymmetric information leads to more progressive education spending, we still see a reduced
redistributive role for education in the sense that policy is still regressive.
In conclusion it must be stressed that the merits of progressive education policies clearly extend
beyond the framework employed in this paper. The value of education undoubtedly transcends its
impact on consumption/leisure outcomes, both individually and in the aggregate. The point of this
paper is not to argue for or against policies designed to bring about more equality in productivity,
but rather to bring to light a potential con
ict between various objectives.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Welfare is denoted Wfb, dened by (1). The Lagrangian for this problem
is given by
L = 	(vp) + 	(vr) + (yp + yr   cp   cr): (22)
The envelope theorem implies @Wfb=@ = @L=@. Using this, and substituting the expression for




























Hence, @Wfb=@ is negative whenever
 >
yp




The second inequality holds as y is increasing in the wage (this is shown in the proof of lemma 3













w are the elasticities of the poor and rich respectively. Thus a less restrictive su-
cient condition for regressivity in this case is 
p
w()  r
w(1   ), for  2 [1=2;E]. In other words,
the percentage change in wage from an increase in funding is lower for the poor type when they
receive the majority of the funding.
20Proof of Proposition 1. Employing the envelope theorem, we characterize the eects of a


















































Indirect (incentive) eect < 0
Education policy aects welfare directly through the rst term which may be positive or negative
as the impact on the poor and rich depends on the functional forms and the planner's aversion
to inequality. It is this term that represents the possible value in spending on the poor and is
captured in the rst-best. If spending in the poor district is not too inecient and the planner
has a high degree of aversion to inequality this term will be positive (when the social objective is
maximin this is unambiguously positive). The proposition holds when the second line is negative
(the indirect eect). As wr is decreasing in , this will be true if the bracketed term is positive.
With two individuals, pooling (bunching) is never optimal so that yr > yp and thus the incentive
constraint implies cr > cp. We require the marginal disutility of labour to be higher for the high
type when they choose their own bundle rather than mimicking. In the absence of income eects,
this is certainly true as gross income is larger and utility is concave in leisure. As cr > cp, we see
that a sucient, but not necessary condition for the result to hold is u12  0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Denote welfare Wfb as the solution to (7). Using the envelope theorem and



























Analogous to Lemma 1, the second inequality holds when y is increasing in the wage. As in the
proof to Lemma 1 we can relax the constant elasticity assumption and derive the weaker sucient
condition.
21Proof of Proposition 2. Under an egalitarian policy there are no dierences in wages across
districts when individuals have the same , so that:
wij = iwp(E) = iwr(1   E) = wi: (29)
Incentive compatibility requires that each type i prefers their own bundle, which now implies fewer


































where we leave factors of two to make explicit that there are indeed two individuals with each wage.
Although rich and poor students with the same  have the same wage they are aected dierently
by spending changes at the optimum. In particular, the impact on rich students of a change in 














































This is negative whenever (@wp=@ + @wr=@) < 0. Using the constant elasticity assumption and















Which is negative at E > 1
2.
Proof of Proposition 3. When there is tagging in the tax problem we can simplify the incentive
constraints in that we only need be concerned with dierences across  within each district. Write























































































































for 1  i  n














































































de = w and collect terms containing after-tax incomes yij. Then substitute the rst
















This is precisely the condition obtained in the rst-best problem except that incomes are no longer
those generated under a lump-sum tax. We immediately see that changes have a negative impact
for any   1=2. Note that with many types partial pooling or bunching may occur so that y is
not necessarily strictly increasing in the wage. However all that is required is that the inequality
be strict somewhere. Whether or not this threshold value is larger or smaller than the rst-best
depends on the impact of marginal taxation. Unlike the two-type case, the second-best policy
may be more progressive than the rst-best if relative output from the poor district increases due
to distortionary taxation. If marginal taxes are progressive enough this may indeed be the case.
However, we cannot say more without fully describing the tax schedule (which would involve very
restrictive assumptions).














(wm   w)l(w)f(w)dw; (35)
23in which  is the multiplier on the budget constraint. There are a few things to note. The rst is
that the transfer preserves the ordering of wages so that the mass of each type is unaected by the
change. Also we have used dw=d = wm w. Ignoring , we now decompose this into eects above






(wm   w)l(w)f(w)dw +
Z ws
wm
(wm   w)l(w)f(w)dw: (36)
From the denition of wm, we have
Z wm
ws
(wm   w)f(w)dw =  
Z ws
wm
(wm   w)f(w)dw: (37)
Thus, if l(w) is increasing in w we have the result. To show this note that rst-best optimum is
described by the rst-order conditions from the problem dened in (14) as well as that for the
individuals labour supply.
u1(wl(w)   Tw;l) =  (38)
u2(wl(w)   Tw;l) =  w (39)
The optimum is characterized by the equalization of the marginal utility of consumption, so that
u1(wl(w) Tw;l) =  is constant for all w. The individuals rst-order conditions can be simplied to
u2(wl(w) Tw;l) =  w. Totally dierentiating with respect to w yields two equations describing
@C
@w and @l








The inequality holds when u(c;l) is concave.
Proof of Proposition 4. Employing a dynamic version of the envelope theorem22, we charac-

























22A relatively accessible statement and proof of this result can be found in Caputo (2005).
24Noting that dw=d = 0 for s = 2 S, dw=d = wm   w for s 2 S and that the mass of types is






































The transfer always results in a decrease in utility for those above the mean, as K(w) is unambigu-
ously positive in this range. To show this, rst note that  = E(1=w). Rewrite K(w), replacing





































where the population mass is  > 1 (recall the redistribution is over a population of mass one that
is a subset of the total population). If the distribution is symmetric around the mean then we see
this is true. It is also true if the distribution is positively skewed as we might expect with a wage
distribution. Thus, K(w) is positive and the eect of an increase in  is negative for those above
the mean.
If the overall impact of an increase in  for those below the mean is negative, the result is shown.
This is true when K(w) is negative for these types. Let K(w) > 0 for at least some below the
mean, then we must compare the relative impacts of a change in . First, we show that K(w) is










As  is constant (and positive) and u(c(w)) is at least weakly increasing in the wage, we focus on
23The reason we restrict the eect of changes to S  W is for analytical convenience. In particular we may











w3[wu(c(w))   y(w)] =
V (w)
w3 ; (49)
which is non-negative so long as u(0)  0. In deriving (49), we have used the denition of V (w),
as well as V 0(w) = u(c(w)), from the rst-order incentive compatibility condition. We saw earlier
that the transfer of productivities is dened such that there is a zero-sum. In particular, that
Z wm
ws
(wm   w)f(w)dw =  
Z ws
wm
(wm   w)f(w)dw: (50)
Thus, K0(w)  0 is a sucient condition for the proposition to hold.
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